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ABSTRACT
John Rawls’s shift from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was prompted by his
dissatisfaction with Theory’s account of stability. Rawls’s later account of stability places the
idea of public reason at its center. On one influential reading, Rawls models stability as a mutual
assurance game, wherein stability is provided by assurance of commitment to the shared
conception of justice. In recent years, a growing number of convergence theorists have argued
that Rawls’s assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, fails in societies characterized
by pervasive disagreement. These theorists propose convergence as offering superior assurance.
This thesis argues that the stability convergence offers is fragile due to the very pluralism with
which convergence theorists are rightly concerned. Moreover, convergence does not do well at
explaining why citizens, understood as politically free and equal, wish to cooperate on fair terms.
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1

INTRODUCTION

John Rawls’s shift from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was prompted by his
dissatisfaction with Theory’s account of stability.1 Rawls’s later account of stability places the
idea of public reason at its center. On one influential reading, Rawls models stability as a mutual
assurance game, wherein stability is provided by assurance of commitment to the shared
conception of justice.2 Contract theorists have long been concerned to show how a stable
political order is possible despite deep and pervasive disagreement. The story is a familiar one
from Hobbes to Rawls: stability requires that each of society’s members has the assurance that
they will not be taken advantage of should they choose to cooperate, that is, members want to do
right by their fellow citizens only if they believe that their fellow citizens will do right by them.
For Rawls, the threat to stability arises on the assumption that each member wants to act justly
but needs the assurance that others will do the same, even when temptations arise from within

1

Some scholars, most notably Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman, and Paul Weithman, highlight
Rawls’s dissatisfaction with, in particular, the argument in chapter IX of Theory as prompting his move to
political liberalism. See Brian Barry, John Rawls and the Search for Stability, ETHICS 890 (1995);
SAMUEL FREEMAN, Congruence and the Good of Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS
278 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); PAUL WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM?: ON JOHN RAWLS’S
POLITICAL TURN 68-96 (2010) [hereinafter WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. Others, most
notably Burton Dreben and Allen Buchanan, highlight the shift in Rawls’s concern from providing an
account of justice to that of legitimacy, while Weithman, on the other hand, has insisted that what
originally prompted Rawls’s move to political liberalism was his interest in showing that justice as
fairness—including both of Rawls’s principles—would be stable for the right reasons. See BURTON
DREBEN, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 316 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 2003) [hereinafter DREBEN, On Rawls]; PAUL WEITHMAN, RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
AND REASONABLE FAITH 91 (2016) [hereinafter WEITHMAN, REASONABLE FAITH]. Further still Dreben,
more controversially, has thought that what prompted Rawls’s move was seeing the first two-thirds of
Theory as contradicting the last third. See DREBEN, On Rawls, at 316. But cf. WEITHMAN, REASONABLE
FAITH 85-111 (2016). The interpretation of Rawls’s dissatisfaction with part III of Theory that I am
assuming is sufficiently general to align with the main thrust of most of these accounts, and in places
where it diverges I make note.
2
WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 326-335; Weithman has since been
joined by Stephen Macedo and Gillian Hadfield.

2

the “self-interested point of view.”3 Rawls famously remarks, “even with a sense of justice
men’s compliance with a cooperative venture is predicated on the belief that others will do their
part.”4 The question is whether from the self-interested point of view—when the gains of
injustice outweigh the desire to act justly—the rational course of action will be to free-ride on
others’ cooperative efforts. Without the assurance that others will maintain their sense of justice
rather than free-ride, or in any other way ignore their sense of justice, defection becomes the
dominant strategy. This is the basic problem of mutual assurance.
In recent years, “convergence” liberalism has established itself as the main theoretical
competitor to Rawlsian “consensus” liberalism. Some convergence theorists argue that Rawls’s
solution to the assurance problem fails because Rawls’s assurance mechanism, in the form of
public reason, is fragile in societies characterized by reasonable pluralism. In short, these
theorists argue that when Alf and Betty engage in public reason, Alf cannot infer from Betty’s
adherence to its guidelines that Betty will actually choose to maintain her sense of justice rather
than defect.5 In other words, Betty’s public display of constrained deliberation does not provide
Alf assurance that she will actually maintain her sense of justice. These theorists propose
convergence as offering a superior assurance mechanism. I argue, however, that the stability
convergence offers is fragile due to the very pluralism with which convergence theorists are
rightly concerned. Moreover, convergence does not do well at explaining why citizens,
understood as politically free and equal, wish to cooperate on fair terms. This paper is organized
as follows. Section I discusses the relationship between public reason and stability. Section II

3

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 295 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY].
Id. at 336.
5
Gaus, Tale of Two Sets, supra note 40, at 317-18; Kogelmann and Stich, When Public Reason
Fails Us, supra note 42, at 5. Thrasher and Vallier, The Fragility of Consensus, supra note 41, at 943946.
4

3

sketches the basic features of convergence à la its chief architects Gerald Gaus and Kevin
Vallier, on the one hand, and Rawls’s more familiar consensus account of public reason
liberalism, on the other. Section III canvasses the assurance problem and convergence theorists’
attempts to solve it. Finally, Section IV argues that convergence’s assurance mechanism renders
stability fragile and unrealistic in deeply diverse societies.
2

STABILITY AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON

The idea of public reason is primarily a view about the justification of principles and policies in a
liberal society. In particular, it is the reason of equal citizens in a liberal constitutional
democracy when they act as a collective to exercise political power. For Rawls, public reason is
a set of guidelines stipulating that when making arguments and decisions about constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice, citizens and public officials are to rely on political values
drawn from a political conception of justice. But public reason also has other important
functions. On one influential reading of Rawls’s later thought—most notably the interpretations
of Paul Weithman,6 Stephen Macedo,7 and Gillian Hadfield8—the assurance problem is solved
by public reason. Understood in this way, we can view public reason as playing both a
normative and a practical role. First, there is the “moral, not [] legal, duty”—the duty of
civility—to be able to explain how principles and policies that members advocate are justified by
the political values of public reason.9 And second, there is the practical role of securing mutual
assurance by citizens signaling their commitment to the political conception over their private

6

WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 326-335.
Stephen Macedo, Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public
Sphere, in SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL 32-36 (2010) [hereinafter Macedo, Why Public Reason].
8
Gillian Hadfield and Stephen Macedo, Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of
Public Reason, LAW AND ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8-15, 46 (2012).
9
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216 (expanded ed., 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
7

4

interests. When citizens adhere to the guidelines of public reason while deciding on
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, they signal their allegiance to the political
conception over their comprehensive doctrines, and when they do not adhere to the guidelines of
public reason, they signal their allegiance to their comprehensive doctrines over the political
conception.10 Exactly how citizens do this is the subject of much of this paper.
2.1

The Problem of Stability

Rawls tells us in the 1993 preface to Political Liberalism that “to understand the nature and
extent of the differences [between Political Liberalism and Theory], one must see them as arising
from trying to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that
the account of stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole.”11 The
kind of stability Rawls is referring to is “inherent” stability, which he contrasts with the imposed
stability of the Hobbesian sovereign.12 Rawls remarks that when inherent stability obtains,
“inevitable deviations from justice are effectively corrected or held within tolerable bounds by

10

I do not mean to suggest, nor does Weithman et al., that public reason should be understood as
a type of practical agreement. Rather, public reason understood as playing two roles—a normative and a
practical role—is what Weithman’s reading suggests (and Macedo and Hadfield are explicit about its
“practical” role), and Vallier, John Thrasher, Brian Kogelmann, and Stephen G. W. Stich (whose views I
canvass below) follow Weithman in viewing public reason as playing both roles.
11
Id. at xv-xvi.
12
See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 78-79 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 2008); JOHN RAWLS, The Sense of Justice, in COLLECTED PAPERS 103-104 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 3, at 125, 436; See also Samuel Freeman, Political
Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 623-627 (1994).
See also WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 43-51. But cf. George Klosko,
Rawls, Weithman, and the Stability of Liberal Democracy, RES PUBLICA 241-244 (2015). For more on
the distinction between inherent and imposed stability, see Edward McClennan, Justice and the Problem
of Stability, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 7-8 (1989). The Rawls of Political Liberalism spoke of
showing “stability for the right reasons” rather than “inherent stability”. Nevertheless, Rawls’s
underlying concern was the same for both. See also WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 1, at 67. Thus I shall use “inherent stability” and “stability for the right reasons” interchangeably
throughout this paper.

5

forces within the system.”13 When Rawls says that he is trying to show the inherent stability of
justice as fairness, he means that he is trying to show that the basic institutions informed by it,
taken together, generate their own support.
Recall that part III of Theory treats the problem of stability in two parts.14 The first part,
discussed in chapter 8 of Theory, argues that members of the well-ordered society would
normally acquire an effective sense of justice. Rawls sketches a three-stage process of moral
development effected by just institutions to show how this is so.15 Just institutions—crudely
put—shape the character of those who live under them, such that they answer in kind to the just
actions of others. In the second part, Rawls argues that each member of the well-ordered society
would, from the viewpoint of “full deliberative rationality”16—taking account of all her
desires—judge that it would be good for her to maintain her sense of justice. Because the
character formation needed for stability would be effected by institutions informed by justice as
fairness, Rawls thought that justice as fairness—once institutionally realized and publicized—
would stabilize itself.
However, Rawls’s argument for inherent stability, and in particular for the second of
these two parts, depends upon a solution the assurance problem. But a well-ordered society is
one whose basic structure is regulated, and is known to be regulated, by principles of justice and
is inhabited by members with an effective sense of justice—it is a society in which “everyone
accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice,”17 where “acceptance”

13

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 3, at 401.
Id. at 397.
15
Id. at 405-434.
16
Id. at 417 (“It is the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in
which the agent reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these
plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his most fundamental desires.”).
17
Id. at 4.
14
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implies a disposition, which each knows that everyone has, to act on those principles. We might
think that, ipso facto, the stability problem has been overcome since each member has a sense of
justice and a well-ordered society has full compliance. But this is not so. Rawls tells us that
problems remain.18 Even with a sense of justice members need to be reasonably sure that if they
are to act justly others will do the same. Rawls says that citizens may come to “lack full
confidence in one another” and “may suspect that some are not doing their part, and so they may
be tempted not to do theirs.”19 This is the heart of the mutual assurance problem for stability.
To the extent that what follows appears to rely too heavily on Weithman’s reading of
Rawls’s move to political liberalism—specifically, to Weithman’s emphasis on the role that
public reason plays in solving the assurance problem—I offer the following two pleas. First,
nearly all the current scholarship on the relationship between public reason and mutual assurance
situates itself in relation to Weithman’s canonical reading. And second, it is Weithman’s reading
that the convergence theorists I discuss in this paper are working from, and as such it does not
seem wholly inappropriate to work from the same.
A distinctive feature of Weithman’s interpretation of Rawls’s move to political liberalism
is that he sees the problem of stability from part III of Theory as, in effect, the same as in
Political Liberalism. Namely, the problem is one of showing how acting justly is the best reply
to others acting justly. This is Rawls’s Nash Equilibrium model, according to which stability is a
“condition of general equilibrium” in which “everyone knows that everyone else acts justly, and
each replies to the justice of others by being just himself.”20
Rawls offers different solutions to the assurance problem throughout his career, and these

18

Id. at 295-296, 435.
Id. at 211.
20
WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 44.
19
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differences plausibly explain the changes from Theory to Political Liberalism. The Rawls of
Theory attempted to solve the assurance problem by showing that a congruence relationship
obtains between the concepts of justice and goodness, that is, that having an effective sense of
justice is a good for each member of a well-ordered society. Rawls argued that from the
standpoint of “full deliberative rationality,” members want to live up to ideals of personal
conduct, friendship, and association included in justice as fairness as part of their good.21 Rawls
thought that the value members in the well-ordered society attached to the realization of these
ideals would “normally outweigh” temptations to defect.22 Whatever members think they might
gain from free-riding, by, say, evading their taxes, or acting in any other way contrary to their
sense of justice, is normally outweighed by the good of realizing these ideals. Seeing their
endorsement of their sense of justice as central to their good, each member is motivated to
comply with the public conception and knows that everyone else is similarly motivated. Hence,
common knowledge of compliance obtains and mutual assurance is preserved, or, as Weithman
puts it, “Each member judges…that her balance of reasons tilts in favor of maintaining her desire
to act from the principles of justice as a highest-order regulative desire in her rational plan, when
the plans of others are similarly regulated.”23
Dissatisfied with this account, the Rawls of Political Liberalism introduces the idea of an

Specifically, Rawls says that the desire to be just is “practically identical” with the desire to
attain four ends. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 3, at 499. These are the desire to (i) “express [their] nature
as free moral persons”; (ii) avoid the psychological costs of hypocrisy and deception; (iii) “protect[] in a
natural and simple way the institutions and persons [they] care for”; (iv) participate in forms of social life
that “bring to fruition [their] latent powers.” Id. at 499-501.
22
WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 85. Here Weithman draws our
attention to the long footnote at the end of JOHN RAWLS, Political Not Metaphysical, in COLLECTED
PAPERS 414 n.33 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). And later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls tells us that the
values and ideals of justice as fairness “normally outweigh whatever values oppose them.” RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 155 (emphasis added).
23
WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 63.
21
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overlapping consensus, wherein each affirms the political conception for reasons internal to their
own reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In Political Liberalism as in Theory, Rawls tells us
that “stability involves two questions.”24 The first is whether members of the well-ordered
society would acquire a sense of justice. Rawls continued to think they would. The second is
whether members would judge that they should maintain their sense of justice.25 On the new
account as on the original one, stability depends upon members wanting to live up to certain
ideals that are only realized when they maintain their sense of justice. But instead of stability
depending upon their wanting to live up to the set of ethical ideals assumed in Theory, the Rawls
of Political Liberalism argues that stability depends upon their wanting to live up to political
ideals. In effect, then, overlapping consensus establishes what Theory’s congruence argument
failed to.26
But just as in Theory so in Political Liberalism, the decision to maintain one’s sense of
justice depends upon a solution to the assurance problem. The Rawls of Political Liberalism
implies that the public knowledge of the existence of an overlapping consensus would solve it,

24

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 141.
On this account, the political conception would stabilize itself in the second way because “a
reasonable and effective political conception may bend comprehensive doctrines toward itself.” Id. at 246
(emphasis added). The political conception, when institutionalized, encourages an overlapping consensus
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
26
As Weithman painstakingly argues, Rawls introduced the idea of an overlapping consensus to
establish what Weithman calls Theory’s “Nash Claim” (CN ):
Each member of the WOS [well-ordered society] judges, from within the thin theory of the good,
that her balance of reasons tilts in favor of maintaining her desire to act from the principles of
justice as a highest-order regulative desire in her rational plans, when the plans of others are
similarly regulated. WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 63.
Weithman tells us that Rawls’s political liberal solution to Theory’s problem then moves us to the
Nash Claim of Political Liberalism (CN *):
Each member of the WOS [well-ordered society] judges, from within her comprehensive view,
that the balance of reasons tilts in favor of maintaining her desire to live up to the values and
ideals of justice as fairness, at least when others live up to those values as well. Id. at 275.
25

9

thereby securing stability.27 In other words, citizens must not only affirm the political
conception on the basis of their own comprehensive doctrines, they must know that others do so
too. But as is the focus of much of Weithman’s study, “[W]hen the concepts used by the very
fully comprehensive doctrines are so different from those of justice as fairness [or any one of a
class of liberal conceptions], how can it be known to take part in an overlapping consensus?
How is public knowledge of an overlapping consensus possible?”28 Weithman argues that the
prominence of public reason in Political Liberalism is explained in part by the need to solve this
very problem.29

3

CONSENSUS VS. CONVERGENCE

As I emphasized in the previous section, Rawls’s account of public reason is advanced as part of
an argument for the stability of a well-ordered society. But there is another view of public
reason which, like Rawls’s view, takes as its starting point a fundamental commitment to the
freedom and equality of citizens. And this view, like Rawls’s view, takes the commitment to
freedom and equality to generate a duty—or requirement—of public justification. The other
view to which I refer is convergence liberalism. In this section I contrast convergence à la Gaus
and Vallier with Rawls’s consensus account. As I will explain below, the difference between
consensus and convergence conceptions of public reason is in effect a difference between shared
and diverse justificatory reasons.

27

Id. at 326.
Id.
29
Weithman tells us that Rawls’s concern with the assurance problem explains the content of the
wide view. (“What citizens know about one another’s commitment to the authority of a conception of
justice depends, in part, upon what concepts and methods of reasoning they actually use when they argue
about basic political questions. That, I believe, is why Rawls introduces guidelines of public reason—to
provide a solution to the assurance problem.”) Id. at 159.
28
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3.1

Justificatory Reasons: Shareability and Intelligibility

Justificatory liberalism places a constraint on the permissible use of state coercion or political
power. Specifically, it stipulates that political institutions, laws, or basic rules must conform to a
principle of public justification. Accordingly, such institutions, laws, or rules are politically or
morally justified if and only if each member of the justificatory public—however this public is
specified30—has reason to accept them as binding. Call this the public justification requirement.
In Rawls’s political liberalism, this requirement finds its expression in the “liberal principle of
legitimacy” and related “ideal of public reason.” Rawls often discusses both together as a
requirement of reciprocity in reason-giving. Rawls tells us that:
[T]he idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity says: Our exercise
of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for
our political actions—were we to state them as government officials—are sufficient, and
we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.31
30

There are, indeed, a variety of ways that Rawls or convergence theorists could characterize the
justificatory public—who it consists of and what they know. On David Estlund’s view, for example,
membership of the public is restricted to a subset of actual citizens: the justificatory public includes only
“qualified points of view”. See, DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY 40-64 (2007). On Gaus and
Vallier’s view, members of the justificatory constituency are not actual citizens, but actual citizens’
“idealized counterparts,” while for Rawls membership consists entirely of “reasonable” citizens. See
GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE
AND BOUNDED WORLD 264 (2011) [hereinafter GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON]. Among the
characteristics of reasonable citizens as specified by Rawls is an acknowledgement of the fact of
reasonable pluralism and a commitment to satisfying the criterion of reciprocity. Political liberals also
tend to idealize members of the justificatory public by assuming they meet a certain standard of cognitive
or moral capacity, and that they are free of some of prejudices and biases that plague actual citizens. (For
Rawls, the standard is “reasonableness”.) The degree of idealization varies among political liberals.
Gaus and Vallier, for example, are critical of what they call the “radical idealization” of Rawls and other
political liberals (where choosers are thought to be fully rational, or as in the case of David Gauthier fully
rational and fully informed), and instead argue in favor of what they call “moderate idealization,”
according to which citizens’ idealized counterparts reason more closely to that of actual citizens. See
GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON, at 276; KEVIN VALLIER, LIBERAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC
FAITH 145-177 (2014) [hereinafter VALLIER, PUBLIC FAITH]. Justificatory liberals also tend to idealize
members by assuming they are interested in cooperating with others on mutually acceptable terms. Given
these idealizing assumptions, the question political liberals concern themselves with is not with what to
do when disagreement emerges among the irrational, prejudiced, uncooperative, etc., but rather what to
do when reasonable, good-willed people coming together thinking about politics arrive at different
conclusions in their sincere efforts to cooperate.
31
JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 137 (1999).
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There are many versions of the public justification requirement on offer.32 The general idea of
Rawls’s (consensus) version is that laws and policies are only justified by reasons reasonably
acceptable to each citizen,33 that is, by publicly available (shared) values and standards.34 Under
Rawlsian consensus, to show that some proposal is publicly justified, members of the public
appeal to reasons they all share in virtue of their common citizenship; they appeal to their shared
view of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens and its
associated political ideals. When citizens appeal to public reasons, in other words, they appeal to
reasons “guided by a political conception the principles and values of which all citizens can
endorse.”35 Rawls’s requirement to publicly justify the exercise of political power follows from
(i) the recognition of the “burdens of judgment” and the consequent “fact of reasonable
pluralism,” and (ii) a commitment to the freedom and equality of all citizens. For Rawls, it is
only when the liberal principle of legitimacy is met that the exercise of coercive power is
justified. When such a justification obtains, freedom and equality is preserved and respected
despite the necessity of political power.36 A more general formulation of the public justification
requirement, however, has recently been offered by Vallier and Fred D’Agostino:

32

See, e.g., Paul Billingham, Convergence Justification Within Political Liberalism: A Defense,
RES PUBLICA 136 (2016) [hereinafter Billingham, Convergence Justification]; Gerald Gaus, Coercion,
Ownership, and the Redistributive State, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 53 (2010); Andrew Lister,
Public Reason and Reciprocity, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3-4 (2017); VALLIER, PUBLIC
FAITH, supra note 27, at 24; FRED D’AGOSTINO, FREE PUBLIC REASON: MAKING IT UP AS WE GO 33
(1996); Kevin Vallier, In Defense of Intelligible Reasons in Public Justification, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY 8 (2015); JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 161 (2011).
33
For an illuminating, in-depth consideration of “reasons all can accept” (RACAs), see James
Bohman and Henry Richardson, Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and “Reasons that All Can
Accept”, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009).
34
Other consensus theorists include JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 261273 (2011); DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY 40-64; Macedo, Why Public Reason, supra note
6, at 19-35; ANDREW LISTER, PUBLIC REASON AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY 17 (2013).
35
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 10.
36
Id. at 137
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PJP: A coercive law L is justified in a public P if and only if each member i of P has
sufficient reason(s) 𝑅𝑖 to endorse L.37
Public reason liberals like Vallier, Gaus, and D’Agostino locate the main difference between
convergence and consensus accounts of public justification in their competing interpretations of
the nature of the R variable. On consensus models more generally, 𝑅𝑖 is the same for each
member of the public. Reason R must be a shared public or political reason (or set of reasons)
that each member of the public can accept or endorse.38 Reasoning publicly on this view means
reasoning on the basis of shared reasons, as reasons stemming from moral or religious
comprehensive doctrines will be the subject of reasonable disagreement. Conversely, Gaus and
Vallier’s convergence model requires only that reason R be intelligible to each member of the
public. Gaus and Vallier intend a technical notion of intelligibility. A reason is intelligible when
each member of the public can understand and appreciate it as a reason according to the reason
giver’s own evaluative standards. As a consequence, a publicly justified law L may be based on
an intelligible but different justification 𝑅𝑖…𝑛 for each member of the public i. That is, Alf’s
religious reason RA is intelligible—and thus justificatory—when all citizens can see RA as

Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, Public Justification, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2018). See also Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier, The Role of Religious Conviction in a
Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions,
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 53 (2009) [hereinafter Gaus and Vallier, Religious Conviction].
37
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To say that reason R must be a shared reason is not to say—as some have mistakenly read
Rawls as saying—that there may be only one R for which all members of the public accept. Rather, for
Rawls, there may be multiple justifications accepted by different citizens, as long as each justification
appeals to shared reasons that all citizens accept as reasonable. For further discussion of the distinction
between “strong” and “weak” models of consensus, see JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT
PERFECTION 263-264 (2011); Jonathan Quong, Three Disputes About Public Justification: Commentary
on Gaus and Vallier 2 n.2 (unpublished paper, 2008). See also Paul Weithman, Convergence and
Political Autonomy, PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 338 (2011) (“[F]or Rawls, public reasons are shareable
in a relatively weak sense…the fact that public reasons are shareable in this sense does not imply citizens
and legislators ‘reason identically.’”). See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 241.
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justified for Alf according to Alf’s reasonable39 religious evaluative standards, even if citizens
reject those standards for themselves. Suppose RA is based on rabbinic legislation enacted for the
sake of tikkun olam, “repairing the world,” that Alf believes is binding. Betty, an atheist, rejects
as false those reasons based on rabbinic legislation or any divinely revealed law. Rejecting them
for herself, however, Betty still acknowledges rabbinic decree as a reasonable, if false, evaluative
standard. On convergence, then, RA still counts as justificatory, since all citizens (even Betty)
can see it as justified according to a reasonable evaluative standard. Consensus, on the other
hand, rejects such a reason as lacking justificatory status. Consequently, the intelligibility
requirement allows for a broader range of reasons to figure into the justification of a political
decision than does Rawls’s consensus standard, since intelligible reasons can figure into the
justification of a given law despite those reasons being unacceptable according to others’
evaluative standards. In this way, members may converge on a given law for wholly different
reasons.40
Convergence theorists advance two main arguments in favor of convergence over more
familiar consensus models of public justification, including Rawls’s. The first, which I will not
pursue here, is that convergence better respects reasonable pluralism and places fewer restraints
on individual liberty than does consensus.41 Convergence theorists wonder, if the purpose of
public justification is to ensure that political power is only exercised over someone if that power

Here Gaus and Vallier do not mean “reasonable” in the sense specified by Rawls.
Gaus and Vallier argue that there is an asymmetry “between reasons to justify to another a law
and reasons to reject that law.” Gaus and Vallier, The Role of Religious Conviction, supra note 36, at 52
(emphasis in original). This implies that reasons for supporting a proposal, on the one hand, and reasons
for rejecting that proposal, on the other, are not subject to the same requirements. Concerning religious
convictions, for example, the idea is that it would be wrong to impose a law L solely on the basis of
religious reasons since some members of the public will not hold within their belief-set such reasons, but
religious reasons can still justifiably defeat L.
41
VALLIER, PUBLIC FAITH, supra note 27, at 45-72; Kevin Vallier, Convergence and Consensus
in Public Reason, PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 4-6 (2011) [hereinafter Vallier, Convergence].
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can be justified to her, why demand that the reasons justifying the power in question be shared
reasons? If a law L can be justified to each member of the public by a convergence of different
reasons, so the thought goes, such an agreement could satisfy the requirement to publicly justify
coercive power just as well as consensus, while at the same time not placing unfair burdens on
persons of faith by excluding their reasons as justificatory.42 The second is that convergence
offers greater stability than does consensus. Specifically, convergence discourse’s signaling
device serves as a better assurance mechanism than does consensus’s signaling device.
4

CONVERGENCE DISCOURSE AND THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL
ASSURANCE

Recall the problem of mutual assurance. Citizens with a sense of justice prefer to comply with
just principles, even against their personal interests. However, even with a sense of justice they
are unwilling to make such sacrifices unilaterally. Rawls remarks, “The sense of justice leads us
to promote just schemes and to do our share in them when we believe that others, or sufficiently
many of them, will do theirs.”43 Thus each citizen who is inclined to comply with the demands
of justice needs to be assured that others will do the same. Without assurance of others’
compliance, a citizen will reasonably worry that others will take advantage of her just behavior.
Merely having an effective sense of justice, then, is not enough to secure the stability of a society
well-ordered by a reasonable political conception of justice. The fact that each has an effective
sense of justice must also be common knowledge. As stated above, on Weithman, Macedo and
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Billingham, Convergence Justification, supra note 29, at 136-139; Christopher Eberle,
Consensus, Convergence, and Religiously Justified Coercion, PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 285 (2011);
Vallier, Convergence, supra note 39, at 2-6; Gaus and Vallier, The Role of Religious Conviction, supra
note 34, at 53-56; Gerald Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Pubic Reason Liberalism, in
MULTICULTURALISM AND MORAL CONFLICT (Maria Cookson and Peter Stirk eds., 2009); GAUS, THE
ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON, supra note 27, at 276-292.
43
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 3, at 236 (emphasis added).

15

Hadfield’s reading of later Rawls, public reason solves this problem. In recent years, however, a
number of convergence theorists have for various reasons come to doubt the possibility of
Rawls’s public reason solving the assurance problem. Gaus,44 and John Thrasher and Vallier45
argue that Rawls’s public reason cannot solve the assurance problem because public reason is
mere cheap talk. Brian Kogelmann and Stephen G. W. Stich46 agree that public reason is cheap
talk, but argue that the cheap talk problem can be overcome by resorting to convergence
discourse as costly signals, thereby solving the assurance problem.
Thus much of the current convergence scholarship focuses on various signaling
devices—direct and indirect—that serve as assurance mechanisms. But in focusing on
competing signaling devices, they focus on one component of a much larger argument for
generating and maintaining the mutual assurance of members of a well-ordered society. In the
following section, I outline the dominant criticisms leveled against consensus public reason as an
assurance mechanism in the existing literature and evaluate the alternative mechanisms that
convergence theorists have proposed. Along the way I gesture towards some of the advantages
of consensus over convergence, though I do not claim these remarks constitute a positive
argument in favor of consensus. Rather, I suggest we have less reason to be optimistic about the
stability that convergence offers than convergence theorists recommend. One question that is
likely to arise throughout my discussion is whether the real-world problems that I claim threaten
convergence as an assurance mechanism are relevant to Rawls’s well-ordered society. I submit
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Gerald Gaus, A Tale of Two Sets: Public Reason in Equilibrium, PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
317 (2011) [hereinafter Gaus, Tale of Two Sets].
45
John Thrasher and Kevin Vallier, The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and
Stability, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 943-946 (2013) [hereinafter Thrasher and Vallier, The
Fragility of Consensus].
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Brian Kogelmann and Stephen G. W. Stich, When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence
Discourse as Blood Oath, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 5 (2016) [hereinafter Kogelmann and
Stich, When Public Reason Fails Us].

16

they are. The problems I discuss are problems that arise even among members understood as
rational and reasonable, motivated by reciprocity.
5

THE FRAGILITY OF CONVERGENCE

The main appeal of the consensus view is found in its attention to reasonableness, reciprocity,
and respect. But as much of my discussion has tried to bring out, a further need which
convergence theorists must attend to is political stability. This section distinguishes between
what I shall call strong and weak stability. Strong stability obtains in a society when its basic
institutions, taken together, generate their own support.47 Recall that basic institutions generate
their own support in two ways. First, institutions generate their own support by eliciting a sense
of justice. Second, institutions bring it about that citizens judge it rational to maintain their sense
of justice rather than defect. Institutions are able to support themselves in the second way only if
the assurance problem is overcome. Weak stability, on the other hand, obtains in a society when
its basic institutions tend to generate their own support, but they do not do well at correcting
themselves when infractions occur. Moreover, weak stability is stability that is likely to persists
for periods of time but is liable to disruptions. Consensus and convergence theorists alike are
interested in strong, rather than weak, stability.
On one side we have Thrasher and Vallier’s convergence model of indirect public reason,
which I argue represents a form of weak stability. On the other side is Kogelmann and Stich’s
convergence model of costly signals, which I argue represents a form of strong stability.
Nevertheless, for reasons that will become clearer, neither is an advance over the stability that
Rawlsian shared reasoning offers.
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In this I follow Rawls’s “inherent” stability. See supra note 11.
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In criticizing Rawls’s solution to the assurance problem, convergence theorist take as
their starting point the following. Critics charge that when Alf and Betty engage in public
reason, Alf cannot infer from Betty’s adherence to its guidelines that Betty will actually choose
to maintain her sense of justice rather than defect.48 In other words, Betty’s public display of
constrained deliberation does not provide Alf assurance that she will actually maintain her sense
of justice. Recall that the assurance problem arises on the assumption that members already have
a sense of justice—due to the forces of social learning at work in a well-ordered society—but
need to be reasonably sure that others are going to continue to maintain their sense of justice if
they are to maintain their own. Implicit in convergence theorists’ worry, then, is that adhering to
the guidelines of public reason is cheap talk: “We can understand Rawlsian displays of shared
public reasoning as what economists call ‘cheap talk’.”49 Thrasher and Vallier define cheap talk
as “costless or very inexpensive, non-binding communication in a game.”50
Thrasher and Vallier develop one way of understanding the worry that adhering to the
guidelines of public reason is cheap talk. On their view, the problem with using Rawlsian “direct
public reason”—whereby citizens directly assure one another of their commitment—as a means
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Gaus, Tale of Two Sets, supra note 40, at 317-18; Kogelmann and Stich, When Public Reason
Fails Us, supra note 42, at 5. Thrasher and Vallier, The Fragility of Consensus, supra note 41, at 943946.
49
Gaus, Tale of Two Sets, supra note 40, at 317. The name “cheap talk”, however, is a little
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plan to maintain their sense of justice. In other words, adhering to the guidelines of public reason is too
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to political stability is that it is open to “noise” and “amplification”. The wide view of public
reason creates a problem of noise because once citizens are allowed to introduce reasons
stemming from their comprehensive doctrines, it will be difficult to distinguish reasons based on
the political conception from those that are not so based: The problem becomes one of
distinguishing between communication that signals allegiance to the political conception, thus
providing assurance, and communication that does not.51 Since the public provision of reasons is
the main way that citizens signal their allegiance to the political conception, Thrasher and Vallier
tell us, true signals of allegiance must be easily distinguishable from noise.52 The second
problem for direct public reason is the amplification of noise: small errors in communication,
multiplied over large numbers of interactions, “can create ‘informational cascades’ that can
dramatically undermine mutual assurance consensus equilibria.”53
In response to these alleged problems with Rawls’s conception of public reason, Thrasher
and Vallier develop an alternative account on which stability owes to a process of “indirect
public reason”, that is, “without direct, deliberative assurance that all will affirm the political
conception.”54 On this view, assurance is generated and maintained through social mechanisms
known as “choreographers”. For Thrasher and Vallier, these “public choreographers are
primarily bodies of norms, often legal, though sometimes informal or formal moral norms.”55 As
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Id. at 942. One way to avoid this problem is to move from the wide view to the exclusive view,
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Id. at 934.
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Id. at 948.
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long as citizens follow the relevant public choreographers, and know that others do so too, the
assurance problem is overcome and the political conception is stable. Their running example is a
traffic light at a high-traffic intersection. Thrasher and Vallier ask us to imagine the following
scenario. First, imagine a case with no stop signs or lights. Assurance mechanisms are needed
in order for drivers to safely cross the intersection without colliding into one another. Absent
signs and lights, drivers must directly assure one another by coordinating with their own lights,
horns, and eye contact. “This,” Thrasher and Vallier tell us, “is directly analogous to the
conception of direct public reason.”56 While we can improve matters with four-way stop signs,
as the number of vehicles increase, the amount of direct coordination needed becomes more
costly since drivers must still determine who first arrived at the stop. Their “obvious solution” to
the traffic problem is to install a traffic light. “Traffic lights correlate coordination among
drivers to an independent, public signal.”57 By following a traffic light, Thrasher and Vallier tell
us, “drivers no longer need to directly assure one another of their intentions by signaling”; rather,
“the choreographer generates assurance indirectly.”58 The traffic light forms and maintains
assurance of others’ compliance and citizens no longer need to coordinate directly with one
another. As the traffic light example is meant to bring out, for publicly recognized
choreographers, citizens will simply “realize that it is in [their] best interest to follow the public
signal.”59
As I understand it, three problems face the Thrasher-Vallier model of indirect public
reason through publicly recognized choreographers. I only mention the first two and focus on
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the third. First, the task remains of identifying relevant choreographers capable of providing
assurance.60 Second, a system of indirect public reason pushes deliberation to the periphery. At
the very least, public discussion plays a less central role than most political liberals might wish.61
But the main difficulty with the use of indirect public reason, particularly as it pertains to
assurance, is that it relies on citizens deciding to be just issue-by-issue. Specifically, Alf’s
obeying traffic laws at an intersection will not assure Betty that he will serve on a jury when
called upon, or that he will not cheat on his taxes. On an indirect model, Alf can only provide
assurance to Betty that he will not act on his temptation to, say, desert his post in times of war if
Alf, in fact, does not desert his post (or does not defect in a suitably similar situation). On the
Thrasher-Vallier model, members are left to factor the payoffs associated with the good of not
maintaining their sense of justice on an issue-by-issue basis. Perhaps in some instances members
will choose to maintain their sense of justice even when strong reasons tell against acting justly,
and perhaps in some instances members will maintain their sense of justice even when it is no
longer in their best interest to do so. But in other cases, members may not. The main problem
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Though I do not have the space here to defend, I think this difficulty can be overcome, though
its solution departs from the type of stability Rawls envisioned.
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with members deciding to be just issue-by-issue, particularly as it pertains to assurance, is that it
will be difficult for members to determine whether the relevant others—or a sufficient many of
them—will actually follow the appropriate choreographer or shirk. In response, perhaps
convergence theorists can suggest citizens simply look to current desertion rates and factor their
fellow citizens’ chances of defection. As long as they can predict that a sufficient many will
follow the relevant norm, then all is well. This suggestion, however, opens assurance up to
further questions and complications not found under consensus, questions and complications
about which citizens may reasonably come to doubt. Rawls sought to keep the principles of
justice and the guidelines of public inquiry as simple and straightforward as possible to “insure
that public reasoning can publicly be seen to be—as it should be—correct and reasonably
reliable in its own terms … Hence applying liberal principles has a certain simplicity.”62 Further
complicating the process of securing assurance does nothing in the way of putting doubts to rest.
Moreover, mere observation of others’ compliance without knowledge of their rationale is open
to wide interpretation. Citizens may reasonably wonder whether others’ reasons for complying
are good reasons—that is, stable reasons—or capricious, etc., ones. This problem is only further
compounded the more diverse a society becomes.
Abandoning the publicity of rationales renders stability under Thrasher and Vallier’s
model weak for the following reason. A society’s basic institutions under the Thrasher-Vallier
model will tend to generate their own support since, after all, citizens will recognize that it is in
their best interest to follow certain public choreographers, such as traffic lights. But this is not
always so for other public signals, and citizens may reasonably worry whether a sufficient many
will, say, cheat on their taxes if they think they can get away with it. Citizens need not believe
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that it is likely that their fellow citizens will cheat on their taxes in order for assurance to be
compromised; citizens need only come to doubt in order for defection to become the dominant
strategy. Recall that Rawls thought members of the well-ordered society have reason to defect if
they come even to doubt—and are not reasonably assured—that others will do their part. Rawls
saw assurance as something that builds over time.63 The type of assurance Rawls envisioned
entails a commitment to forgo the gains of injustice, come what may, rather than leaving oneself
open to choose the action promising them the greatest return. Rawls remarks, “we cannot
preserve our sense of justice and all that this implies while at the same time holding ourselves
ready to act unjustly should doing so promise some personal advantage.”64 For Rawls, members
of the well-ordered society are not motivated to follow traffic laws and to pay their taxes because
failure to do so violates the norms of each, or because they see compliance as in their best
interest. Rather, they do so because they have a stronger preference for mutual cooperation—
and for realizing other ideals of free and equal citizenship—that normally outweighs the gains of
breaking traffic laws and evading taxes. That the gains of injustice are normally outweighed in
this way is one of the ways that institutions informed by the political conception generate their
own support.
I thus characterize Thrasher and Vallier’s model as representing a form of weak stability:
while basic institutions will tend to generate their own support due to citizens following, I shall
grant, most publicly recognized choreographers, sufficient doubts may arise over whether their
fellow citizens will follow all other choreographers. This situation becomes especially
problematic when the “inevitable” injustices that Rawls speaks of occur: Basic institutions will

63

Rawls states this more clearly later in RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 60, at 197.
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 3, at 498. Rawls goes on to say that “the just person is not
prepared to do certain things.” Id.
64

23

not do well at restoring themselves when infractions occur if restoration comes at too great a cost
relative to citizens’ amount of assurance. Absent right reasons, citizens lack sufficient assurance
to willingly do their part to restore institutions when injustices occur. Injustices, Rawls tells us,
are only a matter of time, even in a well-ordered society.65 Strong stability requires a willingness
on the part of citizens to restore institutions when these inevitable injustices occur. But when
citizens’ compliance with choreographers owes to their “realiz[ing] it is in [their] best interest”66
to do so, a willingness to restore institutions is on less solid grounds. Stability, in other words, is
fragile. To the extent that indirect public reason avoids the problems of “noise” and
“amplification”, it does so at the expense of strong stability. Note that none of this requires that
citizens be unreasonable or no longer motivated by a desire to answer in kind; these are problems
that occur even in the well-ordered society.
Kogelmann and Stich offer a different solution to the cheap talk problem. They argue
that the cheap talk problem can be overcome by resorting to convergence discourse as costly
signals: Successful participation in convergence discourse requires a considerable network of
communication and knowledge about a wide range of comprehensive doctrines other than one’s
own.67 The burden of learning the relevant doctrines, according to Kogelmann and Stich,
furnishes convergence discourse with a costly enough assurance mechanism to overcome the
cheap talk problem. Let us suppose that Alf, whom Betty does not anticipate knows much about
Jainism, offers an elaborate Jain-based argument. Since Alf is not a Jain, Betty knows that Alf
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put considerable effort into learning the doctrine well enough to offer his argument. Betty knows
that Alf incurs opportunity costs when he makes the decision to learn the relevant doctrine. That
Alf is willing to incur such costs signals he is serious about achieving the mutual assurance
equilibrium. At the heart of convergence as costly signals, Kogelmann and Stich tell us, is that
members “will have to engage is what Rawls calls reasoning by conjecture,” whereby “we argue
from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular, and
try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political
conception.”68
An interesting corollary of Kogelmann and Stich’s view, as they explain it, is that the
more diverse a society is the better its ability to overcome the assurance problem: convergence
discourse becomes costlier the more diverse a society becomes. This seems obviously correct.
Signaling costs can only increase with diversity; signals impose a cost on the signaler that can
only increase as diversity increases.69 To the extent that there was ever a cheap talk problem, I
think Kogelmann and Stich’s convergence model has the resources to overcome it. If
convergence discourse as costly signals could be realized, it would be sufficiently costly to

There is, however, a difference between Rawls and Kogelmann and Stich’s uses of reasoning
from conjecture. For Rawls, the purpose of reasoning from conjecture is to try to reconcile conflicts
between private and public values: reasoning from conjecture is Alf’s attempt to show Betty, a Jain, how
she might reconcile her faith in Jainism with a moral commitment to the political conception. For
Kogelmann and Stich, convergence discourse demands reasoning from conjecture as a means to “(1)
successfully convince others to support their respective position and to (2) also engage with [them] on
terms [they] can endorse.” Kogelmann and Stich, When Public Reason Fails Us, supra note 44, at 9. For
a rich defense of how reasoning from conjecture can be respectful and sincere, see Micah Schwartzman,
The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture, JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 529-33 (2012). But cf.
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secure strong stability. Nevertheless, it is impossible if not at least highly impractical to have a
working model of costly signals in diverse societies: convergence as costly signals
underestimates the difficulty of constructing and maintaining ongoing political arrangements in
societies marked by deep pluralism and pervasive disagreement, even where those societies are
well-ordered. Communicators may in fact be sincere in their signaling, but if assurance depends
upon citizens being able to publicly justify laws in terms of all their fellow citizens’ diverse
doctrines, and to engage issues on the public agenda in the language of all those diverse
doctrines, such assurance would hopelessly complicate the deliberation and implementation
processes. There is not only great moral value, but great administrative value in having a shared
language and rationale that everyone, for all their differences, can readily access. 70 Attempts to
discuss laws and policies in terms of every possible comprehensive doctrine, rather than
approaching the public agenda with a shared sense of the relevant considerations, renders the
deliberative and administrative processes even more intractable than they are under the already
complicated conditions of shared reasoning. I do not claim that convergence under Kogelmann
and Stich’s model is a form of weak stability so much as that it cannot be realized in diverse
societies. The mechanism that makes assurance, I will grant, sufficiently costly is the very
mechanism that makes a working model of it, for all practical purposes, unrealizable.
6

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The attraction of an account of public justification will depend in part on its attention to our
deepest moral convictions regarding reasonableness, reciprocity, and mutual respect. I think
these convictions receive their best expression in a consensus, shared reasons account. But its
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attraction will also depend on its ability to maintain a just equilibrium over time. I have
suggested that convergence as presented by Thrasher and Vallier, on the one hand, and
Kogelmann and Stich, on the other, is not better suited to this task than consensus. At the very
least, I have offered reasons to suggest we be less optimistic about the stability convergence
offers than convergence theorists appear to be.

